Utah Supreme Court Overturns Conviction of Warren Jeffs

2010-07-27 10:55:19

By Donald Richter

On July 27, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously ruled to reverse the conviction of Warren Jeffs on two counts of rape as an accomplice and remanded the case to the 5^th District Court for a retrial. The State has two weeks to seek a rehearing challenging this decision and one month to decide whether to pursue a retrial. Judge James Shumate, who presided over Mr. Jeffs’ previous trial, has scheduled a hearing on retrial for August 18 at 9 a.m. in St. George, Utah.

The Supreme Court prefaced its decision with the following observation regarding the importance of the presumption of innocence:

Recognizing the highly publicized nature of this case, we remind the parties, the trial court, and observers, that the presumption of innocence guaranteed to all by our Constitution demands great care from the courts and those who prosecute on behalf of the people. As this state’s court of last resort, we are not at liberty to accept less, nor could we, consistent with our oaths to support, obey, and defend the constitutions of this state and country.

The conviction was reversed on the basis of the erroneous instructions on consent given to the jury, which was told that sexual relations were without consent if “[t]he person was 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and the actor was more than three years older…” or “[t]he person was younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the offense the actor occupied a position of special trust in relation to the person.”

In its determination to gain a conviction, the State twisted the law by focusing on the fact that Mr. Jeffs was more than three years older than Ms. Wall and that he occupied a position of trust in relation to her. The Court ruled that “it was erroneous for the jury instructions to equate the term ‘actor’ with the term ‘defendant’” and that the “actor” specified by the statute was the person alleged to have committed the offense and not someone accused of being an accomplice.

The Court also stated the obvious principle that a person cannot be convicted of being an accomplice to a crime unless it has been established that a crime actually occurred: “The question of accomplice liability cannot enter the equation until after a determination has been made that a crime has been committed.”

Although the Court based its decision on the above interpretation of the law and ignored most of the arguments raised in Mr. Jeffs’ appeal, it did address the additional point of the erroneous instructions the trial court gave the jury regarding accomplice liability. The trial court had rejected the defense’s request that the jury be instructed that to convict the defendant of being an accomplice to rape they must find that he intended that the result of his conduct would be that the crime occur.

Quoting from its earlier decision in the case of State v. Briggs, the Supreme Court ruled that “[t]o show that a defendant is guilty under accomplice liability, the State must show that an individual acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense.”

The State had argued that without actually intending that a crime occur, a person could incur criminal liability if his reckless conduct helped facilitate the crime. Quoting from State v. Comish, the Court rejected this argument by ruling that the term “‘accomplice’…does not include a person who merely provides an opportunity for one who is disposed to commit a crime.” “Taken to its logical extreme,” the Court observed, “this interpretation could result in accomplice liability attaching to a person who leaves his house unlocked, leading to the theft of his own personal property inside the house.”

Continuing, the Court stated, “And we have also held that even less innocent behaviors do not appropriately categorize an individual as an accomplice if that individual had no intention that the underlying crime be committed.”

While the decision as a whole is a model of clear thinking and judicial impartiality, two parts of the document are somewhat disappointing. The section on “Background” merely repeats as fact the story Elissa Wall told in her court testimony and in her book Stolen Innocence. While the Court was not attempting to rule on the veracity of this account, Elissa’s willingness to participate in the fabrication of false medical records suggests that other parts of her testimony may be untruthful as well.

Considerably less excusable is the Court’s apology near the end of the decision: “We regret the effect our opinion today may have on the victim of the underlying crime, to whom we do not wish to cause additional pain.” The Court earlier had stressed the “presumption of innocence” and also ruled that the trial court had erred in convicting Mr. Jeffs as an accomplice when they had failed to establish the existence of a crime. Without a crime, how can there be a “victim”?

We most heartily endorse the Court’s concluding remarks on extending the protections guaranteed by the Constitution to all citizens:

[W]e must ensure that the laws are applied evenly and appropriately, in this case as in every case, in order to protect the constitutional principles on which our legal system is based. We must guarantee justice, not just for this defendant, but for all who may be accused of a crime and subjected to the State’s power to deprive them of life, liberty, or property hereafter.

CLICK HERE for a complete copy of the Supreme Court decision.

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